GAME THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

INVITED LECTURES

• I. Evstigneev, Manchester (R. Amir, T. Hens, K. Schenk-Hoppé), Evolutionary finance: survival and extinction of portfolio rules (abstract)
• J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Louvain-la-Neuve, Oligopoly in pure exchange economies (abstract)
• H. Keiding, Copenhagen, Core extensions: structure, properties, axiomatizations (abstract)
• O. Moeschlin, Hagen, Von Neumann models and the Oeuvre of Jerzy Łoś (abstract)
• S. Robinson, Madison, Concepts of efficiency in a class of linear models (abstract)
• S. Tijs, Approximate Nash equilibria for strategic games (abstract)
• R. Vohra, Providence (R. Serrano), Cooperation and Incomplete Information (abstract)

REGULAR LECTURES

• J. Abdou, Paris, (H.Keiding) Stable effectivity sheaves (abstract) - NOT PRESENTED
• J. Albizuri, Bilbao, Generalized coalitional semivalues and the Owen value (abstract)
• A. Al-Rabadi, Portland, N-player many-valued quantum games (abstract) - CANCELLED
• J. Arin, Bilbao, (V. Feltkamp) Implementing with veto players: simple mechanisms (abstract)
• A. Arkit, Zielona Góra, The existence of globally stable price mechanism for pure exchange models with upper semi-continuous multi-valued excess demand (abstract)
• R. Branzei, Iasi and Tilburg, (D.Dimitrov, S.Tijs) The egalitarian solution and the egalitarian split off set for cooperative games (abstract)
• R. van den Brink, Amsterdam, (G.van der Laan, V.Vasiliev) On the distribution of dividends in games with ordered players (abstract)
• I. Bula, Riga, (D. Rika) Arrow-Hahn economic models with weakened conditions of continuity (abstract)
• S. Bylka, Warszawa, Competitive policies for a production-distribution system (abstract)
• I. Ćwięczek, Kraków, (A.Malawski) Risk aggregation in the Radner-type general equilibrium model (abstract)
• T. Driessen, Twente, (H.Meinhardt) Convexity of production, common pool and oligopoly games (abstract)
• M. Ekes, Warszawa, Consumption in economic models related to large games (abstract)
• J. Filar, Adelaide, Perturbation Theory and Mathematical Programming Problems (abstract)
• S. Flaam, Bergen, Production games, core deficit and shadow prices (abstract)
• A. Floriska, Gödölö, (I.Dobos) A dynamic Leontief model with remanufacturing and consumption (abstract) - NOT PRESENTED
• E. Ferenstein, Warszawa, On infinite-horizon multi stage stopping games with priorities
• A. Garnaev, St.Petersburg, Competition for staff between two departments (abstract)
• I. Georgescu, Turku, Revealed preference and consistency conditions for fuzzy choice functions (abstract)
• R. Golański, Warszawa, Bilateral sequential bargaining with perfect information and different protocols
• A. Idzik, Warszawa (K.Junosza-Szaniawski), KKM-type theorems for primoids (abstract)
• M. Kamiński, Irvine, Parametric rationing methods (abstract) - CANCELLED
• K. Kasprzyk, Warszawa, Recognition rules in weighted majority games and their implications (abstract)
• M. Koster, Amsterdam, Sharing returns of cooperatve investment (abstract)
• R. Kruszewski, Warszawa, Growth model with migration: structure of optimal saving rates (abstract)
• K. Krzyżewski, Warszawa, On indifference curves in mean-risk decision models (abstract)
• A. Kukeli, Ft.Collins, Uncertain demand and optimal exercise of strategic real option to enter a new market - CANCELLED
• S. Lahiri, Johannesburg, Envelope theorems for finite choice sets (abstract) - NOT PRESENTED
• I. Lindner, Hamburg, Global asymptotic properties of large weighted voting games (abstract)
• M. Malawski, Warszawa, Procedural values for cooperative games (abstract)
• T. Matsuhisa, Ibaraki, Core equivalence in economy under awareness (abstract)
• V. Matveev, Pskov, The root-mean-square equilibrium in game problem with vector-valued payoffs (abstract) - NOT PRESENTED
• A. McLennan, Minneapolis, (R.Tourky) From Lemke-Howson to Kakutani (abstract)
• J. Miękisz, Warszawa, Long-run behavior of games with many players (abstract)
• J. Mrówka, Kraków, (A.Malawski) Poverty, distributive justice and freedom in the Arrow-Debreu set-up (abstract)
• W. Połowczuk, Wrocław, On two-point Nash equilibrium in concave bimatrix games (abstract)
• T. Radzik, Wrocław, (W.Polowczuk) Two-point equilibria in constrained bimatrix games (abstract)
• R. Ramer, Amsterdam, On backward and forward induction (abstract)
• D. Ramsey, Wrocław, (K.Szajowski) Correlated equilibria in Markov stopping games.Numerical methods and examples (abstract)
• M. Ramsza, Warszawa, Procedurally rational players through descriptive simulations abstract - NOT PRESENTED
• R. Rempała, Warszawa, Forecast horizon in a dynamic family of one dimensional control problems (abstract)
• A. de Ridder, Nijmegen, (A.van Daemen) A dynamic spatial coalition formation theory (abstract)
• J. Roy, Warszawa, (H.Sosnowska) Strategy-proofness and the distribution of rights (abstract)
• L. Ruiz, Bilbao, (C.Larrea) Quasi-strong perfect equilibrium in the repeated Cournot model (abstract)
• A. Rusinowska, Tilburg, (M.Roubens, H.deSwart) Application of the MACBETH approach to coalition formation (abstract)
• A. Rusinowska, Tilburg, (P.Eklund, H.deSwart) Consensus reaching in committees and coalition formation (abstract)
• A. Sabak, Warszawa, Solutions of selected games with large and small players (abstract)
• V. Scalzo, Napoli, (J.Morgan) Discontinuous pseudo-games and applications (abstract)
• B. Shitovitz, Haifa, (E.Einy, O.Haimanko, D.Moreno) Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information (abstract)
• S. Sobieski, Łódz, Numerical analysis of a game-theoretic problem of spatial allocation (abstract)
• D. Sondermann, Bonn, (P.Dubey) Perfect competition in a bilateral monopoly (abstract)
• H. Sosnowska, Warszawa, Comparison of different approaches to the normalized Banzhaf values of games with a priori unions (abstract)
• T. Sozański, Kraków, A graph-theoretic characterization of the core in a homogeneous generalized assignment game (abstract)
• K. Szajowski, Wrocław, (D.Ramsey) Correlated equilibria in Markov stopping games. The main characterizations (abstract)
• S. Vannucci, Siena, Coalitional game forms with topological closure systems (abstract) - CANCELLED
• T. Wachowicz, Katowice, What are negotiation strategies that allow negotiators to achieve efficient outcomes? (abstract)
• J. Werner, Minneapolis, Information revelation and market crashes (abstract)
• A. Wieczorek, Warszawa, Existence of equilibria in mixed large games (abstract)
• A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Warszawa, Modelling stock exchange by dynamic games with a continuum of players of finitely many types (abstract)
• P. Więcek, Wrocław, Pure equilibria in a simple dynamic model of strategic market game (abstract)
• E. Yanovskaya, St.Petersburg, Serial cost sharing (abstract)
• N. Yoshihara, Tokyo, (Y.Xu) A new insight for three bargaining solutions in convex problems (abstract)